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There has been a rather simplistic debate in Denmark recently as to whether politics 
is about arguments or feelings. This reflects a more general question of whether be-
haviour in general depends on rational considerations or feelings (gut feelings). I will 
examine whether Socrates is entirely rational, or whether he is also influenced by 
emotion. 
The research has divided opinions on this. Vlastos2 and Irwin
3 believe that Soc-
rates did not assume irrational urges or desires. Penner
4 and Reshotko5 assume that 
Socrates recognizes such inclinations, but that they are too weak to influence behav-
iour. And Devereux6 argues that even strong urges cannot overwhelm knowledge, 
which is our only rescue. But Brickhouse/Smith7 believe that correct meaning can be 
overwhelmed by desires and feelings (in so-called ‛diachronic meaning or akrasia’). 
One particular issue discussed in this research is the figure of the demon. Vlastos 
unsurprisingly subjects the demon to the interpretation of reason.8 C.D.S. Reeve be-
lieves that religion is generally subject to elenchus-based (i.e., reasonable) moral 
 
1 Socrates is here pretty much the Socrates appearing in the early Socratic aporetic dialogues (I have 
included Phaedo in this essay). In other words, Group I in Vlastos 1991: 46 f. This Socrates is Pla-
to's reconstruction of the historical person, who is portrayed as a philosophical project that differs 
from what we find in later dialogues. Vlastos lists ten characteristic points (1991: 47-49). Against 
this background, it is necessary to see a development in authorship (see also Brandwood 1990 
which is based on stylistics). The development or maturation of Platonic thought is, of course, 
gradual, as can be seen in Gorgias and Menon among others. 
 2 G. Vlastos 1991: 166 and 285 f. 
 3 T. Irwin 1977: 78. 
 4 T. Penner, 1997: 128 og 2000: 164. 
5 Reshotko 2006: 55; 1992: 163-66. 
 6 D. Devereux 1995: 387-8 
 7 Th. Brickhouse/Nicholas Smith, 2012: 236 
8 1991: 286. 
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norms.9 Brickhouse/Smith, on the other hand, believe that the demon trumps rea-
son.10  
I intend to argue here that Socrates is rational in that he generally relies on elen-
chus as the method of cognition, and that he does not ignore emotions but accepts 
rational feelings. The religious incentives, including the demon that naturally 
emerges in his life and on which he acts, and which could be perceived as irrational, 
are (and are shown to be) rationally justified. The same seems to apply to dreams, 
oracles, prophecies, authority, obedience and shame. 
Modern (practical) rationality is typically: 1) a practical question of the means to 
achieve some purpose. It doesn't have a certain goal.11 Modern practical rationality 
has positive connotations – it is assumed that we should all be effective and rational. 
2) Therefore, it is also typically perceived as opposing goal-directed irrational feel-
ings and religious beliefs, which should be avoided. It must be possible to give rea-
sons.12 
Similarly, Socrates' rationality means that irrational feelings must be avoided, 
and everything must be justified. Socrates follows the argument where it wants to go 
and complies completely with it. He strives for consistency in truth and moral in-
sight, and in subsequent behaviour, with the focus being placed on consistency be-
tween goals and means (i.e. a question of values and how to secure them). But ra-
tionality here is related to the benefit of the individual and in general related to val-
ues (Wertrationalität). It is not just a question of efficiency at any price. Instead, it is 
a question of efficiency in achieving a particular goal: moral life and happiness. It is 
not a question of material goods or life and death, but of morality when acting.13 But 
Socrates also says, 'the good life, the beautiful life and the moral life are the same' (Cr. 
48b7). Hence, happiness lies in the moral life. This is a controversial point of view that 
requires justification. 
 
 9 Reeve 1989: 68-73. 
10 Brickhouse/Smith 1989: 168f, TLS Jan./Feb. 1990. Smith is of the opinion that religion generally 
‘trumps’ elenchus 2000: 196. 
11 Closer analysis shows that the 'goal' (e.g. material growth) is a norm set by society (the system, 
the civil servants). 
12 Brown ch. I, which focuses on scientific rationality, mentions universal rules and assumptions (in-
formation). Cf. the application of the practical syllogism to a specific subject matter. Bennett indi-
cates that the criterion for attributing rationality is the ability to make dated and universal state-
ments (74, 86, 97). Bees are therefore not rational, as they are without language! 
 13 Ap. 28b5-9, cf. 28d6-19, Cr. 48c6-d5. 
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Socrates makes the following point about the good life in Crito (46b): 'I am not 
complying only now but all the time with anything else in me other than with the prin-
ciple (λόγος) that seems to me best when I think about (λογιζομένῳ) it.' So we do not 
expect Socrates to act on irrational feelings, hunches and blind faith. 
Occasionally, in critical situations, however, he also largely complies with his dai-
monion (the god); his entire missionary work is imposed upon him by Apollo. This 
raises the question of the relationship between his rationality and his religious atti-
tude, or perhaps between reason and feeling (gut feeling!). It depends on whether the 
demon and mission are emotional elements in his case. It is also possible that his ra-
tionality itself holds an irrational element for us. Or perhaps Socrates’ religiousness 
contains a very special kind of rationality. 
In any case, there are two areas in which rationality plays out: at the theoretical 
level of opinions, and at the practical level of attitudes and actions. In the latter case, 
his rationality is not only about the means to achieve a random goal, but also about a 
specific objective.14 Socrates’ life was spent on defining moral concepts in order to 
make himself and fellow citizens as good and wise as possible. The remedy for this 
was elenchus, critical conversation. 
Socratic knowledge: Examples of rationality as truth and practical wisdom 
Socratic insight (phronesis) relates to truth (theory) and morality (practice) (Ap. 
29e), i.e. true morality. But human wisdom (sophia) is nothing,15 and Socrates is ig-
norant: he does not believe that he knows what he does not know (Ap. 21d). He 
claims that he seeks the truth of what morality is (Prot. 360 e), and that he does not 
know what that morality is (MM. 80c). But at the end of the day, Socrates does know 
something. 
 So, what does Socrates know?16 And how does he obtain his 'human wisdom' 
(Ap. 20de)? He knows many small things (Eud. 293b). For example, it is true that he 
has never received a fee for teaching (Ap. 31c), and that no-one who opposes the 
majority to prevent injustice will survive in politics (31e). He knows that it is wrong 
to implore jurors (35c). He also knows that prison and exile are evil, and, most im-
portantly, that he has never wronged anyone (37ab). For instance, he has never 
agreed anything unfair with anyone else (33a). The old accusation is untrue (19d), 
which is demonstrated empirically. All these are simple empirical facts. 
 
14 See Arist. EE ii, 11: arete leads to and justifies the target (eudaimonia) (cf. EN 1144a 7-9: arete 
ensures that the target is correct, while reason takes care of the way there). But the goal (e.g. self-
expression or pleasure) is not solely determined by feeling. Reason should accept it (EN 1139a 25 
f.). Reason determines how eudaimonia and the human good should be understood. In Socrates’ 
case, it is clearly reason that determines the objective of not harming others. This goal is justified by 
a view of man that perceives the human soul as the real self, as a moral entity (Cr. 47a-49e). 
 15 Ap.23b, cf. Phdr. 278d, Crat. 400d, 425c. 
 16 See e.g. Vlastos 1991: 238 n.9. 
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But there are deeper insights that have been reached through reasoning (elen-
chus). He generally asserts truth and justice in his apology.17 In other words, theoret-
ical and practical rationality. 
Thus, Socrates does not believe in myths about the gods, such as the myth that 
Zeus behaved violently and that there is animosity between the gods (Euthyph. 5e f.). 
On the contrary, the gods are wise (Ap. 23a) and good (Ap. 21b), and they take care 
of good people (Ap. 41d, Euthyph. 15a).18 For Socrates knows that it is not permissible 
for a better man to be harmed by an inferior, that a good man cannot be harmed in 
life or death (Ap. 30d, 41cd). And most importantly, he also knows that it is harmful 
(cf. G. 475) and shameful (αἰσχρόν) to do wrong. It is never right to damage (ἀδικεῖν) 
other people (Cr. 49b-d, cf. Rep. 335 e). Morality is enough for eudaimonia. One 
should therefore not care about material goods, but about wisdom and truth, making 
one's soul as good as possible (29e). 
He proves Meletos wrong (24c), and he proves that the interlocutors are not 
wise (23ab). Socrates does not believe that he himself knows what he does not know 
(21b, d), because he proves that the oracle is right that he is wisest by just that (22a). 
In other words, his conduct in relation to Apollo is rational.  
Understanding all this requires insight. With sufficient knowledge, one will not do 
wrong to others, thereby avoiding harming oneself as well as avoiding collective 
shame. Hence, morality is knowledge (phronesis M. 88cd, Prot. 356 f.). Therefore, it 
is important to be as wise as possible (Eud. 282a, 283a). Moral insight is the only 
good – it is what makes us happy (Eud. 292b). 
Both happiness and morality therefore require insight, and this insight is gained 
through elenchic conversation. One purpose of such conversations is to create con-
sistency in the interlocutor's concepts. Not least between his goals and means. This is 
the means to gain knowledge (episteme) that can distinguish good from evil (Prot. 
352c). A form of meta-knowledge regarding personal benefit (La. 196a, see 199d). 
But what kind of knowledge is this, and what is a human being, and what benefits us 
as human beings?  
The so-called Socratic paradoxes may help us to gain clarity in this respect. 
These Socratic paradoxes are: everyone seeks the good (for themselves) (Prot. 358d, 
 
 17 Ap. 17c, 18a, 20d, 22b, 24ab, 28a, d, 32a, 33c. 
 18 Xen. Mem. I 4, gives Socratic analogy arguments for divine wisdom and care. See Socrates' own 
 care for his fellow citizens (Euthyph. 3d). 
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M.78a, G. 468b, 499e), morality is knowledge19/immorality is ignorance,20 akrasia is 
impossible (no-one acts wrongly voluntarily) (Prot. 358c)21, virtues are one (Prot. 
349), and morality is happiness (Rep. I, 353d-354a). These paradoxes are proved by 
elenchus.22  
The paradoxes are intertwined. The link between insight and moral paradoxes 
makes it easier to understand that immorality is involuntary. Everyone seeks their 
own good23, and morality is knowledge24 about what is really good and beneficial 
(not just techne, know-how),25 ,so immorality is ignorance, and consequently no-
one is immoral on purpose (moral paradox, Prot.)(cf. Eud. 282a). There is also, as 
we have seen, a supporting argument here: immorality harms the immoral (directly 
G. 474b-475c,26 cf. Cr. 47d, and indirectly Ap. 25e), which means that immorality is 
unintentional, an expression of ignorance. 
Formally, Socratic knowledge is referred to as episteme (knowledge), sophia 
(theoretical insight), phronesis (practical knowledge) and techne (know-how). These 
concepts can be used for this knowledge within a few lines  (Prot. 352cd), but they 
are not synonymous, and there is a difference, among other things, in the ontology 
of this knowledge: is it a disposition (hexis) or an ability (dynamis M. 77b, H. Min. 
 
19 Knowledge is episteme (Prot. 350, 359c f. G. 491b f., 495c f.), insight is sophia, and practical 
knowledge is phronesis (Eud. 281b, d) or craft, techne (Prot. 356d, 357b). The Menon argument is: 
morality is good, all good is embraced by knowledge ⸫ morality is knowledge (M. 87d). And slightly 
expanded: morality does well and is therefore beneficial, the beneficial depends on knowledge ⸫ 
morality is knowledge (M. 87d-88d). Very briefly: if morality is beneficial, then it must be a kind of 
phronesis (M. 88d2-3, 89a). 
 20 This is an intellectualized view of immorality, leaving out emotions.  
 21 No-one wants to choose what one thinks is bad (kaka, ponera 353c) rather than the good (aga-
tha) (Prot.358cd). 
 22 For example, Prot. 352e-358d: the contradictory cannot be claimed along with other opinions. 
23 Prot. 358d, G. 468b7-8, 499e8-9, M. 78b1-2. Vlastos 1991: 148-154. See Aristotle, EN iii,4. 
24 See n. 19. C.C.W. Taylor sees an inconsistency in Socrates' ethics: morality is both knowledge of 
the good for the agent and the good itself, i.e. morality becomes both instrumental for and part of 
happiness. If morality is knowledge of the good, and the good is knowledge, then the latter form of 
knowledge must, according to Taylor, be different from the former (64f). But we should distinguish 
between possessed knowledge (ability) and active knowledge. The latter is happiness too. Morality 
is thus both possessed knowledge and practised knowledge. See Vlastos' 'Happiness and Virtue in 
Socrates' Moral Theory' (1991: ch. 8), according to which morality can be desired both for the sake 
of eudaimonia and for its own sake, cf. G. 468c2-5, Rep. ii, 357b-358a, Arist. EN 1144a1-6. 
 25 J. Gould 7. Contra Vlastos 1973: 204-217, especially 206f. 
26 See Vlastos' discussion 1991: 139-148. He considers the argument to be false even though this fact 
has not been recognized. 
  
6 
375de)? Or has it developed from an urge or desire? How is it acquired (learned, 
practised), maintained and lost?27  
 Such different conceptions of Socratic knowledge reveal how deep and unique 
this knowledge is. In Protagoras, moral knowledge is identified with measurement 
technique (Prot. 356b-357e, metretike techne 356d, episteme 357ab). But it also in-
volves theoretical knowledge and insight (Prot. 360e f., 361c). It is also conceived as 
knowledge of (and equal to) mental health (Cr. 46). Hence, it is an art of life, i.e. prac-
tical ability and knowledge. It is useful knowledge that can make correct use of other 
things, e.g., wealth or talent (Eud. 288d ff.). It is suggested that it is generally about 
being able to distinguish between good and bad (Prot. 352c). 28 And this clearly in-
volves more than know-how. It requires moral insight. This is a very special kind of 
knowledge that cannot easily be taught, and that has few (if any) teachers. However, 
this does not preclude both parties from learning through conversation. 
The good 
It is still unclear what the good (morality) is. We do not learn much more about what 
the good (morality) or knowledge is by being informed that the good (arete) is 
knowledge. However, the two concepts are narrowed down because they are linked: 
the good (morality) is practical knowledge. 
The further determination of the content of morality must take place in special 
studies of specific moral concepts: justice, piety, wisdom, courage and self-rule. And 
friendship. Unfortunately, these studies end in aporia. For example, a definition of 
self-knowledge (morality) as knowledge of knowledge and non-knowledge (meta-
knowledge of a technical nature) is still not knowledge about the good (utility) (Ch. 
172c-175a), even though a number of options are rejected during the conversations. 
There is, of course, a difference in the specific subject of knowledge, e.g., between 
self-restraint and courage. 
However, it appears that the relevant general knowledge must be knowledge of 
the goal and purpose: the good. And it is also clear that justice (i.e. the good, Cr. 48b) 
consists in not harming others. It also appears that all the good is useful. This seems 
 
27Can virtue be taught? (Prot. 319b, 326e-327e, M. 87bc, 89c f., 96c, 99ab, Eud. 282c (Socratic 
doubt), Prot. 357e f. (ordinary view). Are there teachers of virtue? No? (Prot. 327e, M. 89d f, 96c, 
98e). So maybe virtue is not knowledge after all? (M. 98e-99b). Morality should be learnable if it is 
knowledge (Prot. 361ab, M. 87c-89c), but there are apparently no teachers, and therefore it cannot 
be knowledge (M. 89d, 98d-99a). Morality apparently comes as a gift from the gods, unless there is a 
statesman who manages to make another into a statesman (M. 99e f.)! Could it be Socrates, the only 
real statesman (G. 521d)? He teaches through conversation, not by lecturing (Ap. 33ab, cf. ). Other-
wise, Socrates’ mission was in vain. The irony is that Socrates does not know what morality is (M. 
80c)! However, that does not preclude both parties from learning from conversation. 
28 Pol. 283d-285c: the measuring art is partly relative and partly in relation to an absolute norm. The 
latter is involved in all creative arts and in dialectic and the determination of the good (auto t'akribes 
284d). 
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to be a common opinion (endoxon).29 And since moral knowledge is the only good 
(M. 87d, Eud. 292b), morality is useful, and therefore one should be moral. It is ra-
tional to be moral. But how on earth is morality useful? Well, it benefits the soul, just 
as good food benefits the body. Morality is mental health (Cr. 46). Does this mean 
that morality is an individualistic project? Not for Socrates, who had a mission to 
improve his compatriots and a preoccupation with not harming anyone. 
In other words, it is useful and rational to be moral and to avoid immorality. Im-
morality is actually harmful to oneself (G. 475c, M. 77e f, Cr. 47e, 49b).30 Therefore, 
immorality is unintentional, as no-one would voluntarily harm themselves (Prot. 
358cd). To that extent, Socrates advocates a utility morality (Ap. 22e). But it is based 
on a long-term assessment, and it involves knowledge of our real needs.31 Morality 
is itself useful and is an end in itself. So it is not about external material advantages.32 
 Modern philosophers have believed that statements and opinions about the 
moral good and the bad are expressions of wishful thinking and feelings , and are 
therefore outside what can be known. However, for Socrates, the good, the goal of our 
actions, happiness, is given and obvious, just as it was for Greek thinkers in general. 
The details of happiness are debatable. It is therefore not outside what can be known 
or a matter of taste. Socrates argues that short-term pleasure or power is not the way 
to happiness: it leads to unhappiness. The general opinion of happiness is irrational 
because it can have fatal consequences. Happiness (eu prattein, eudaimonia) and the 
good life consists in the usefulness of man, i.e. the fulfilment of his/her mental or 
spiritual needs. Including a moral life. So, there is a generally unacknowledged need 
to be moral! And this is where short-term enjoyment and power (politics) fall 
through. 
The Protagoras may be understood as showing that the moral and good life for 
Socrates is a pleasant life.33 In the sense of a mentally fulfilling life. Morality is, there-
fore, in a very unKantian way, satisfying! In Protagoras, moral knowledge produces 
the pleasant life (cf. the measuring art of Pol. 283d-285c). The Socratic moral 
 
29 It was common to identify the good with the useful (Prot. 358b, M. 87e, Rep. 379b, 354a, 457b, 
505a, Tht.177d). See Xen. Mem. iv.6.8 et seq. and iii.8.5-7. 
30 People who are harmed become inferior people, more unjust (Rep. 335c), which can harm oneself 
(Ap. 25e). Conversely, the good cannot be harmed (Ap. 41cd, 30d). 
31 Knowledge of what is best for the acting person lacks content for Taylor and says nothing about a 
moral life (60). But the moral life for Socrates is, after all, exactly the same as the beneficial and per-
haps also pleasant life (Cr. 48b4-10, Prot. 359e). See H.A. Prichard 1912/1949: 'Does Moral Philoso-
phy Rest on a Mistake?' 
 32 In Rep. ii 357d f. morality is regarded as good both in itself and in its external consequences. This is 
a Platonic development. Socrates, however, has an eye on the fact that his own moral insight has im-
plications for the mental health of his fellow citizens (Ap. 31de). It is indeed his mission. 
 33 The brave seek out the beautiful (moral), the good and therefore the pleasant (Prot. 360a). 
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knowledge is strong (Prot. 352cd). It must therefore be assumed that it involves a 
strong rational desire for a good, i.e. pleasant, life.34 One might as well ask how such 
hedonism relates to Socrates’ mission to make fellow citizens as good and wise as 
possible (Ap. 36c) so that they do not harm each other. They should not be preoccu-
pied with wealth, riches and honour, but should concentrate on insight (phronesis) 
and truth and improve their souls as much as possible (Ap. 29e). The answer is that 
Socrates (if we are right) advocates intelligent hedonism, i.e. a long-term hedonism 
that chooses precisely the aforementioned short-term physical life goals and focuses 
on the enduring joys of the measuring art and the insight into truth (among other 
things, self-knowledge). And the truth in this context means what really benefits 
man. It is also worth considering the utility of the aforementioned popular life goals: 
wealth, reputation and honour (power) (Ap. 30b). This is set in the paedagogical con-
text of the Socratic Umwertung aller Werte: morality has the greatest use because 
from morality stems everything else. It is responsible for other goods, and ultimately 
 
34 Enjoyment is good (Prot. 354c, 358b) and even identical to the good (351e, 354c, 355a) for the 
‘many’, and for Socrates (360a2-3, see 351c4, 353e5-354a1. Cf. Taylor 1976: 208-210, 174-176, Gos-
ling and Taylor 1982: ch. 2-3, spec. 67 (the good is long-term), Denyer 2008: 186f and Adam and 
Adam 1905: xxvi-xxx). The fact that Socrates shares hedonism with the crowd is revealed by his 
noting that 'the answer' to the crowd (the hedonistic analysis of weakness of will) is true (358a), 
that the hedonistic calculus is 'the rescue of our lives' (356e, 357a), and finally that everyone agrees 
that all actions aimed at a pleasant and painless life are honourable, i.e. good and useful (358b). Soc-
rates, however, is not a vulgar hedonist, like Aristippus (Diog. Laert. ii 86-92), preferring a life that 
maximizes pleasure. This means that lower pleasures are weeded out by his hedonistic calculus be-
cause they have painful consequences (Xen. Mem. e.g. IV.5.9-10, II.1.18-19). 
So what is the status of knowledge (which is otherwise the only good M. 87d, Eud.292b)? In Euthyde-
mus, the identification of morality with statesmanship is dropped and replaced by the royal art, 
which is used to produce something useful and good: knowledge of itself (Eud. 292d, 291b-292e, cf. 
Ch. 167a ff. on self-knowledge). Protagoras' relativism cannot include the good and the useful, which 
require expert knowledge. This applies, inter alia, to health and disease (Tht. 171e), agriculture, 
gymnastics, music and food production. The useful is also the aim of legislation, which, after all, ap-
plies to the future (Tht. 177-179c). According to Rep. 353d, it is the function of the soul to 'provide, 
control and consider' and simply ‘live'. This is evidence that reason has a desire for the soul to be 
well (eu prattein). 
The attack on enjoyment in Gorgias has posed a problem. But Gosling/Taylor believe that this ap-
plies to immediate enjoyment, not long-term enjoyment in Protagoras, and that the alleged conflict 
with Protagoras is illusory (1982: 70-77). In addition, Irwin (1977: ch. 4, 103 ff.) defends Socratic 
hedonism, though he sees problems (1979: 202-208). Contra Guthrie IV 231-3, and Vlastos 1991: 
205, 300-302; non-utilitarian moral philosophy 6-7, 214; morality is the goal (Ap. 28b, d, Cr. 48cd). 
See also the later Stoic view of Socrates as anti-Epicurean (Long 1988: 150-71). But see above and 
previous note: 'We admitted that all beautiful (καλὰς) actions are useful (ἀγαθὰς)’ (Prot. 359e). And 
even wrong-doing is harmful to the wrong-doer (Cr. 49b). 
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for happiness (M. 87e-89e).35 Morality is happiness and is therefore the goal (Ap. 28b, 
d, Cr. 48cd). Hence, ‘utilitarianism’ is not an adequate characterization of this posi-
tion.  
Irrational emotions and urges (anger, fear, pain, desire, eros, shame and obedi-
ence) 
The Socratic moral knowledge is strong (Prot. 352cd) and a force (Eud. 292de). It is 
not a slave of passions, as is the general opinion (Prot. 352b; cf. Hume T. 2.3.3). It 
must be assumed that this is because it implies a rational desire for the good/benefit 
of the individual.36 Certain feelings are therefore necessary for human morality. Are 
there not also irrational feelings and desires at stake that may need to be checked? 
Socrates is, admittedly, using rational conversations and arguments to make his con-
versation partners see the good and do it, but he also appeals to his demon, to God, 
to dreams and oracles, to unwritten laws, to shame, fear and obedience.37 If 
knowledge is sufficient to be moral (morality is knowledge), then it must relate to 
the aforementioned things and urges. I will focus on these below. 
 Here it is necessary to add a few words about the much-debated weak-will phe-
nomenon, the well-known fact that reason is overwhelmed by irrational forces (akra-
sia). Here, Socrates' moral intellectualism (morality is knowledge) or rationalism 
(Prot. 352a-357e) is challenged. But he simply denies the appearance of akrasia. It is 
in fact amathia, lack of knowledge/ignorance (357de). He argues this paradox: 'Eve-
ryone wants the good (for themselves)', 'no-one is seeking what one thinks is bad' 
(Prot. 358b-d).38 
 
35 Morality is beneficial and the beneficial is wisdom (always leading to happiness) ⸫ morality is to-
tally or partially wisdom (M. 88e f.). 
36 Prot. 358d, G. 468b7-8, 499e8-9, M. 78b1-2. So moral knowledge cannot be misused. Cf. Rep. i 
335c14-d2 for a more formalistic argument. 
 37 Here I disregard all the irrational, sophistic tricks that Socrates uses or is accused of using. See my 
 Human Wisdom 61. They are not evidence of his own irrationality, on the contrary in fact. 
38 Prudential paradox, as referred to in Arist. EN 1145b25-31: 'no-one acts deliberately (ὑπολαμβά- 
νοντα) against the best.' Does this mean the phenomenal good (Santas) or the real (Vlastos, Pen-
ner/Rowe)? 'No-one is voluntarily looking for the bad or what you think is bad, nor is it in human na-
ture to want to look for what you think is bad rather than good (Prot. 358cd). We pursue the good in 
our actions (G. 468b). The tyrant does not want to kill as such but kills in the belief that it will be ad-
vantageous to him, but it turns out that it is actually harmful. (G. ibid. d). Everyone wants the good. 
For those who want the bad either think that it benefits  or know that it is bad. But the former do not 
know that the bad is bad, and therefore do not want this but what they thought was good. The latter 
know they're hurting themselves. But they also know that injury means unhappiness, which no-one 
wants, and therefore they cannot wish for the bad! (M. 77c-78b). Both G. and M. are therefore arguing 
that we do not want the bad, neither phenomenal nor real. It would be based on misunderstanding of 
our real desires. Εὐδαιμονία is the real good and advantageous (Eud. 278e-279a, 280b). Psychological 
selfishness does not preclude altruism, cf. Socrates' mission (Ap.), or Socrates as a politician (G. 521d, 
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Does this mean that there are absolutely no rational feelings that work against 
reason? Feelings such as pain, fear, anger, evil and urges that do not aim for the good 
(e.g. striving for power, passion and short-term desire)? Or opinions, attitudes and 
actions based on faith, authority or arbitrary choice? The subject was debated way 
back in antiquity. Here are some of the views that have been expressed: 
Xenophon reports that enkrateia is the basis of virtues (Mem. i 5.4), and that no 
distinction is made between sophia and sophrosyne (Mem. iii 9.4. and iv 5.11. Cf. Prot. 
358c2-3). Aristotle agrees: according to Socrates39, arete makes logos correct, rather 
than being the intention and the end (i.e. morality is then about means, rational con-
siderations, rather than the target). But in Aristotle’s view that is the task of sophros-
yne (self-mastery) rather than arete. And it suggests a lack of distinction between 
enkrateia (sophrosyne) and arete (EE 1227b12-19).40 These sources therefore regard 
Socratic morality as emotional regulation.41 
In the Great Moral, however, the view is more rationalistic: Socrates places the 
virtues solely in the rational part of the soul (for Aristotle, the virtues are only 'with 
reason'). The author does not imply that Socrates disregarded non-rational wishes. 
But Socrates turned the virtues into epistemai involving logos situated in the rational 
part of the soul. So, by turning the virtues into epistemai, he removes/overlooks 
(anairei), the soul's irrational part, and thereby pathos and ethos (MM 1182a17-23). 
However, there seems to be a consensus that whether there are non-rational de-
sires or not, knowledge is strong enough to secure the rationality of emotional life in 
general. In Prot. 352-8, knowledge and reason are conceived as the strongest and 
thus as powerful motivators.42 
 
 
 
 
cf. M. 99e-100a), and not least the tenet of the Socratic ethics: do not harm others. Irwin 1977: 254-
286 has a longer conceptual analysis of the relationship between selfishness and altruism. 
39 It is likely to be alluded to, among other things, in Socrates.  
40 For Aristotle morality is not identical to self-mastery, it is inter alia joy in doing the right thing (EN 
1151b34-1152a3). 
41 But see Xen. Mem. 3.9.5 and 4.6.6. 
42 Dan Devereux (2012: 217) surprisingly believes that diachronic opinion akrasia is compatible 
with Protagoras 354-358. But it is Aristotle who dissolves the paradox: according to Socrates, akra-
sia does not exist: no-one acts against what is considered (ὑπολαμβάνοντα) best. That would be due 
to ignorance. But, says Aristotle, a weak-spirited person did not previously think he should act like 
that (EN 1145b25-31). Hence, diachronic opinion akrasia appears possible for 'some' (ibid. 
1145b33) and for Aristotle. 
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Possible irrational motivators in Socratic psychology? 
1) The God. Ap. 30a, 30e, 33c, 38a, 42a, Cr. 48a, 54e. 
Socrates is destined by Apollo to be a missionary among the Athenians, this is his 
'worship' (Ap. 22a, 23b, 28e, 30a, e, 33c). Socrates interprets the oracle answer that 
no-one is wiser than him as an invitation to examine the meaning (21b, e) and show 
that it is irrefutable (22a), and that it means that he was shown to be wisest because 
he considered his wisdom worthless (23b). This applies particularly to his conversa-
tions and study of himself and others (28e, 38a), which are imposed on him by the 
God through oracles, dreams43 etc. (Ap. 33c). 
Is the God a threat to rationality here? Not when we understand that elenchus 
here is rooted in the oracle of God, that is, that the rational here is motivated and has 
its source in the religious. For Socrates, the rational conversation appears  to be of 
divine origin, i.e. the deity is wise and a prerequisite for the rational.44 There is no 
greater good than conversations about morality (38a). 
In Crito, we must abide by the one, if there is one who has knowledge of these 
things [acts that are just and unjust, shameful (αἰσχρῶν) and beautiful, good and 
bad], and for whom we are afraid and ashamed (αἰσχύνεσθαι) (47cd). Who is it? It is 
'the one who knows justice and injustice, the one or the truth itself' (48a). Is Socrates 
talking about the god? Given that Socrates trusts the God (Ap. 29d), who is wise (Ap. 
23a) and who has ordered him to live as a philosopher (Ap. 23ab, 28e), the idea is 
tempting. And when he includes a remark that 'if someone has knowledge', his aim is 
to suggest that this is not to be found among humans. God alone knows the fate of 
Socrates (Ap. 42a), and he leads Socrates on his way (Cr. 54e).  
 But the Holy45 is loved by all gods because it is sacred, and the sacred is not sacred 
because it is loved by the gods (Euthyph. 10d f.). In other words, there are some values 
above the gods, who must therefore respect these values, e.g., justice (Euthyph. 8de). 
The God is therefore both wise and just. For example, it is not ‛legal’ for him to lie (Ap. 
21b).46 Hence, belief in a rational and moral god cannot be irrational for Socrates. 
 
43 Cr. 44a6 ff., Phd. 60e2ff. 
44 It cannot therefore be said, conversely, that the concept of God has its origin in elenchus (reason). 
The position of reason is different in Christianity, where reason and faith are opposed. In Aquinas, 
faith and reason, or religion and philosophy, are complementary – and in Pascal the heart, l'esprit de 
finesse, has its reasons, which (geometric) reason does not know. 
45 The holy or sacred is the part of the just that cares for the gods (Euthyph. 12e). 
46 Brickhouse/Smith (2000: 80f.) believe that Socrates more or less took over traditional religion, as 
in Xenophon. Contra Vlastos (1991: 166), who rightly believes that Socrates here is guilty of the het-
erodox rationalization of Greek religion. The gods are wise, and since wisdom is moral wisdom, the 
gods are moral. New gods! (Euthyph. 5a-c, 6a). The gods are not, as in traditional mythology, in-
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There is also another argument for the rationality of faith in God. Not obeying 
someone who is better (god or human) is both harmful (κακόν) and shameful 
(αἰσχρόν) (Ap. 29b). But if it is harmful and shameful not to obey God, then it is ra-
tional to obey God. 
Summing up, morality is ultimately sanctioned not by the gods but by something 
that stands above the gods. This is the ‛truth’, the objectified ideal of reason. The rea-
son that knows justice and to which Socrates is closest among men. Not to harm oth-
ers and (therefore) not to lie are truths that are in practice justified by self-
knowledge: violation thereof results in damage to the self (Cr. 47de). This is con-
firmed by the demon. 
2) The Demon. Ap. 31cd, 40a-c, 41d. 
The demon is a prophetic (μαντική) force (?), from the little demon (40a) who op-
poses Socrates if he will act inappropriately (μὴ ὀρθῶς) or harmfully ( μὴ ἀγαθόν) 
for himself (Ap. 40a-c).47 Is it the God who has, after all, spoken prophetically 
(μαντεία 22a)? It is at least something divine or demonic (a voice?) (31cd), even a 
sign from the God (40b, cf. Cr. 54e), which is frequent (40c). And Euthyphro links the 
charge of innovation in the religion with the divine sign (Euthyph. 3b, cf. Xen. Ap. 12), 
which is perhaps what Meletos did too (Ap. 31d). To that extent, it is possible to per-
ceive the demon as a manifestation of the God in Socrates. Cf. Crito, where it is said 
that the God leads him (54e). The demon, however, was exclusively apotreptic 
(31cd),48 in contrast to the mission command (as Socrates sees it) from the God of 
Delphi (Ap. 23b, 28e, 29d-30b, 33bc). In Socrates' interpretation, the oracle is pro-
treptic. 
 
volved in internal strife (Euthyph. 5e f.). Socrates is not particularly interested in mythology (Eu-
thyph. 6a, Phdr. 229 f ). In the Ap. Socrates is agnostic about what happens after death. But in Crito 
there is the prospect of a verdict in the underworld (54BC). And in Phaedo, he insists that the gods 
are our benefactors (62b), and that he comes to gods who are very good masters, and that it will be 
better for the good than the wicked (63c). Interestingly, both Apology and Crito end by referring to 
the god who knows the fate of Socrates and leads him on his way. Plato (Ap. 31cd, Euthyph.3b) and 
Xenophon (Ap. 12) do not refer to Socrates’ theology but to the 'divine sign' as a stumbling block. 
But this is doubtful. The voice cannot be the basis for the accusation, as Socrates himself refers to it 
in his defence for not participating in politics (Ap. 31c6 et seq.) (See Burnet 15 f., 127f.). 
47 Burnet (17, 127 f., 165 f.) argues that it is not morally meant, but is solely about consequences, 
has nothing to do with the mission and therefore does not correspond to conscience. The question, 
however, is whether the distinction between morality and the consequences of the action can be 
maintained. Socrates always has morality in mind, and the avoidance of, for example, a political life 
has assured him that he can continue to benefit his fellow citizens (Ap. 31e). Similarly, the absent 
warning against Socrates’ course to death has resulted in him possibly benefiting the residents of 
Hades (Ap. 41b)! The argument in Crito against escape from prison (promise breaking) and a certain 
death is entirely moral. 
48 But Xenophon Mem. 1.1.4 and Theages suggest a positive daimonion. 
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So, is the demon in conflict with Socrates' rule of always only obeying the best 
argument (logos, Cr. 46b)?49 The answer is No. First, the demon’s divine nature 
vouches for rationality. Secondly, you can see the demon's warning, for example, not 
to become a politician (Ap. 31d) as a rational intuition in the style of Aristotle's 
phronesis, with the nous (intuition) that handles the application of moral norms.50 
Finally, Socrates has learned that warnings from the demon have caused him to avoid 
harming himself (Ap. 40a-c). Therefore, it is rational to obey the demon, even if it 
does not explain why the warning is given.51 
As for the demon, it is striking that while Socrates is agnostic about what hap-
pens after death (Ap. 29ab, 37b) before the verdict, after the verdict he is pretty sure 
that death can be a good thing, and that those who assume it is an evil are definitely 
wrong, and the proof is that the usual sign does not stop him (Ap. 40bc).52 Is it then 
rational to believe even in the absence of demonic warning? Yes, because it usually 
comes when he is acting inappropriately. This is an empirical argument. An a priori 
argument follows: that death is either dreamless sleep or an improved version of cur-
rent life, if you're going to believe mythology (40c-41c). Both alternatives are posi-
tive and give us good rational (argued) hope, as well as constituting confirmation that 
the absence of the demon's warning is rational. 
 The demon does not need interpretation like other manifestations of the divine, 
such as oracles, dreams and prophecies. Thus, elenchus is used in the interpretation of 
Apollo's oracle response. However, there is a peculiar parallel between the sign or 
voice and elenchus. They are both 'divine' (elenchus used in the service of god!). And 
both the elenchus and the demon are negative. But the demon can provide knowledge 
that the elenchus cannot: about the dangers of a political life and about the afterlife. 
However, as I have said, this does not mean that its rationality is challenged. 
 
 
 
 
 
49 Burnet (16f.) is categorical: the daimonion is part of the irrational, which does not allow itself to be 
 rationalized. It's just apotreptic. However, this seems premature and overlooks, inter alia, the fact of 
 rational intuition. 
50 EN 1141a 7f., 1142a 23-30, 1143a 32-1143b 5. It has been argued that rational intuition is not 
necessarily negative (Brickhouse/Smith 2005: 45). But in Socrates’ case, it is an intuition that inhib-
its and slows him down and corrects his deliberately rational plans. A practical syllogism could be: 
'(1) politics must in some cases be avoided, (2) Socrates faces such a case ⸫ Socrates avoids politics.' 
(2) is seen intuitively. 
 51 Brickhouse/Smith 2005: 58-52. 
 52 Reeve 1989: 70. 
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3) Oracles, dreams and prophecies. Ap. 33c, 39c, 44a, 50a, Ch. 173a, Phd. 60c, e.  
Socrates knows that through oracles and dreams and other divine intervention he is 
required to be a missionary (Ap. 33c, see the oracle of god Ap. 21e, 22a). How does 
this order relate to reason? Is it an outsider, or is it sanctioned by reason?53 Socrates 
at any rate tests the oracle of god rationally. And oracles borrow authority from the 
god, who is rational. 
 What cognitive status do dreams and prophets have? In prison, Socrates is 
haunted by the dream of a beautiful woman clad in white who says he will come to 
the 'fertile Phthia on the third day' (Cr. 44a), i.e. come 'home' (like Achilleus, Il. 9.363). 
'Home' is understood to be Orphic (!), like a post-mortem existence. The dream here 
is like a prophecy. And the personified laws come to (epistantes) Socrates as in a sight 
or dream (Cr.50a).54 Incidentally, Socrates calls his intuitions dreams (Ch. 173a) or 
prophecies (ibid. 169b). They give him positive information: he has the same dream 
several times in different versions, asking him to practise μουσική. He assumes that 
he is required to write poetry, resulting in an anthem to Apollo and a versification of 
Aesopus’ fables (Phd. 60c-61b). Hence, dreams may need rational interpretation. 
In addition, as we have seen, Socrates himself has a prophetic ability (Ap. 40a), 
which is the sign of god (40b) that opposes inappropriate behaviour. Moreover, he 
himself, close to death, can prophesy that his prosecutors will be punished and tested 
for their way of life (Ap. 39c). The demon has been understood as the intervention of 
reason.55 But Socrates acknowledges that there are sources of insight other than ra-
tional knowledge, e.g., seers and prophets are without knowledge and beside them-
selves (Ap. 22c, Ion 534c, M. 99cd). This could mean that Socrates, when he prophe-
sizes, does not have rational knowledge, and that the demon, insofar as it  prophe-
sizes, does not exhibit rational knowledge. However, this potential dualistic episte-
mology is disregarded by Vlastos, who claims that the true meaning of these state-
ments requires the interpretation of critical reason.56 But while this solution may be 
true of dreams, poetic utterances, other prophecies and oracle responses, it does not 
fit with Socrates’ treatment of the prophetic warnings of the demon, which are taken 
at face value.57 Therefore, it is tempting to solve this problem as we did above in con-
nection with the gods: the demon is the 'sign of god,' and since the gods are rational 
 
53 Brickhouse/Smith 2005: 58, see 1989: 87-100. Contra Reeve 1989: 70. Socrates obeys divine or-
ders and warnings on the basis of the elenchically established divine goodness. 
 54 Burnet 200. 
 55 Nussbaum, quoted by Reeve in Smith/Woodruff 2000: 32 f. See also Gallop (1997: xxiii), who  inter
 prets the demon as Socrates' natural intelligence. 
 56 Vlastos 1991: 170f. 57. 
57 Reeve 1989: 69. 
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and 'better', it is rational to trust them and their prophecies. On the other hand, 
dreams are only rational in retrospect. 
4) Democracy and the unwritten laws. Ap. 41d, 30d. 
A good person is untouchable: it is not 'legal' according to the unwritten laws (them-
iton) that he/she should be harmed by an inferior (30d). This means that good char-
acter cannot be harmed by an inferior. 'The majority' cannot make the good stupid 
and thus bad! (Cr. 44d). Generally, a good man cannot be harmed either alive or in 
death, because he is provided for by the gods (Ap. 41cd). To Socrates, the unwritten 
laws are therefore moral. But it is also 'illegal' for God to lie. This means, as we have 
seen, that there are moral laws that even the gods obey. 
In Apology and Crito, Socrates must choose between the political values of the 
state and justice, i.e. unwritten moral-religious values. See Sophocles' Antigone, 
where Antigone defies the state's ban on burying her brother Polyneikes, who is ac-
cused of treason. She follows an unwritten law that the dead must be buried. It costs 
her her life (by suicide). In Euripides' Iphigenia in Aulis, Agamemnon reverses the 
state's interests over the consideration of the family, but he pays with his life. 
Socrates’ attitude to democracy is conditional: he abides by laws and does not 
escape from prison after the death sentence. He has a tacit agreement with the state 
(Cr. 50c, 51e, 52e). But at the same time, he will not abide by an unjust order (for 
example an order to be a henchman for a criminal junta), or a request to cease phi-
losophizing (Ap.). His rationality and ethical-religious conscience trump his demo-
cratic duty if the latter would be unjust. It is a conflict of two types of moral princi-
ples: obedience to the state on the one hand, and keeping promises (e.g. political 
agreement) and the unwritten norm of not harming others and the moral/religious 
mission (divine injunction) on the other. Democratic duty is based on an agreement 
(not between citizens, but between the individual and the state), but it must be fair. 
The guarantee of justice is here the god or rather the norms behind it (Cr. 47d-48a). 
To compromise here will basically be harmful to yourself and the citizens. It is not 
about living, but about living well, i.e. honourably and justly (Cr. 48b). Injustice is in 
every way harmful and shameful for the unjust (Cr. 49b). This is the rationale of the 
underlying norms, and they are therefore also observed by the rational gods.58 So it 
is rational to be just and moral. 
In other words, Socrates is rational here. He is a democrat insofar as he respects 
laws and regulations to the extent that they are fair. And to the extent that Apollo 
stands for justice, it is also rational to be religious. Socrates rationalizes the gods by 
making them moral. We have seen above that the gods love piety because it is piety, 
and that piety is not piety because the gods love it (Euthyphro 10a). In other words, 
morality is above the gods. Following the morality respected by the gods is rational. 
It is a morality related to the vision that the soul and its health are more important 
 
58 Vlastos 1991: 162. Cf. Reeve 1989: 70. 
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than the body and its health. Hence, it is rational to follow the unwritten laws because 
they are moral. Breaking them is harmful to mental health. 
5) Obedience, shame, and fear (reputation). Ap. 28b-d, 29b, e, 34e, 35a, Cr. 47d, 
49b.  
Socrates asks Meletus if he really thinks that he, Socrates, is not aware that one harms 
oneself when one makes others bad. They will, in turn, harm oneself. This is an exter-
nal, easily graspable rational reason to behave properly. But Socrates has a deeper 
knowledge that doing wrong (ἀδικεῖν) and not obeying one that is better than you 
(god or human) is both harmful and shameful for the perpetrator (Cr. 49b, cf. Ap. 
29b). There are two points here: 1) injustice itself harms others as well as the one 
who is unjust, and it is related to the view of man: the soul is a moral entity, defined 
by its character, which cannot bear to do wrong; and 2) injustice is shameful. This is 
realized by everyone, even Polus in Gorgias. Cf. Ap. 28d: one must stay where it is 
'best', or where one has been placed with no regard for anything but the shameful, 
and cf. 29b: it is shameful not to obey one's superior, god or human. 
Shame is a kind of fear (Euthyph. 12c). And Socrates respects heroic morality and 
fears cowardice and shame, for example, about fleeing from battle as a hoplite (Ap. 
28c). Therefore, he cannot desist from his mission either because this would be tan-
tamount to disobeying the god (37e). In general, Socrates is indifferent to public 
opinion (Cr. 44cd, 47a), but he is aware of his legacy (Ap. 34e) and there is a respect 
for heroic values (Achilleus ibid. 28c). He will follow his own conviction or, where 
appropriate, a superior, e.g., god (Ap. 28de) and avoid cowardice. Moreover, to bring 
his wife and children to court and ask for pity would be womanish (ibid. 35b) and 
would bring shame on the city (ibid. 35a) as well as himself (ibid. 34e). It is rational, 
then, to follow public morality, since otherwise there will be intolerable conse-
quences. Not for his physical life, but for his mental well-being (sense of shame).59 
This applies in particular to the extent that unwritten, objective norms lie behind 
public morality (e.g. the binding obligation of a promise on the state and its officials). 
For what Socrates really fears and is ashamed of is the one, if he exists, who 
knows what justice and injustice are (Cr. 47d). And this one is truth itself (48a, cf. Ap. 
39b). Socrates does not claim that there is an expert in morality but pretends that 
the truth is a person. Of course, he does not question the truth himself, i.e., the objec-
tive moral norms that he has dealt with throughout his life. These standards must be 
followed, as disobedience will harm the individual. He has demonstrated this dialec-
tically. The soul, which is the real self, is damaged by immoral behaviour (Cr. 47cd). 
Therefore, to the extent that Socrates fears and is ashamed of these norms, he exhib-
its rational behaviour. It is a rational fear and shame. And to the extent that these 
 
 59 Socrates’ conventional attitude to the morality of his time is similar to his conventional cult (Eud. 
 302b-303a, cf. Ap. 35d, Phd. 61b, 118a, Sym. 176a. Xenophon gives a picture of a harmless follower of 
 the cult, Ap. 11-12, Mem. I.i.2, I.ii.64). However, this cult is matched and contradicted by a rational the-
 ology. 
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norms (the truth) lie behind public morality, the fear of public morality is rational 
too. 
Conclusion 
Socrates is a rationalist in both the theoretical and practical fields: he seeks con-
sistency in the views on moral issues, both his own and those of his fellow citizens. 
And since moral opinions are crucial to behaviour, he is also a rationalist in this area. 
He seeks understanding and durable definitions of moral key concepts. And thus, he 
seeks the most effective (rational) means to benefit the individual and thus achieve 
the happiness sought by all. The goal for him is the moral life, which is also the happy 
life (eudaimonia). Hence, it is misleading to perceive Socrates as a consequential 
moralist, to see morality as just a means to happiness. Morality is happiness.60 And 
morality means not harming others. Morality is negatively worded, as are eight of the 
Ten Commandments in the Old Testament. Socrates had a mission to impart the same 
insights to others. 
 He is familiar with irrational feelings and urges (anger, fear, desire, pain, eros) and 
obedience to god, his demon, dreams, oracles, etc. and obedience to civil servants. But 
the irrational emotions are neutralized or mastered by a highly rational desire for the 
true good, a long-term pleasant life. 
Obedience to God, demon, oracles, dreams, prophecies and civil society is indi-
rectly rational, to the extent that it mirrors an objective morality which is known by 
rational means.  
Obedience to Apollo is dependent on membership of the Athenian polis and its 
heroic values, and on the rational conviction that moral gods provide for the moral 
man, and ultimately on respect for and love of truth, to be reached by rational 
means. 
Obedience to the demon is primarily dependent on its divinity and its ability to 
guide us away from dangers. 
Obedience to dreams, oracles, etc. is, again, partly dependent on society, and 
partly on personal positive experience, but ultimately dependent on their divinity. 
Finally, obedience to civil society and the state is rationally justified. Civil society 
is ideally 'better' (Ap. 29b) morally speaking than its subordinate, and should there-
fore be obeyed; and the state should be obeyed because the citizens are bound by a 
 
60 Morality is knowledge of happiness, which is morality. Morality1 is knowledge of morality2. We 
do not have two moralities here, but morality1 is possessed morality, while morality2 is morality1 
put into practice. 
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promise of loyalty that, moreover, gives them the benefit of the state. But civil diso-
bedience is required if the state violates moral principles (unwritten laws) that also 
form the background here. 
Socrates sympathizes with heroic values and avoids, among other things, cow-
ardice, ultimately out of respect for basic ethical values. Again, rational behaviour. 
In short, Socrates is rational in thought and behaviour, goals and means, and he 
is not compromised by irrational impulses in his self-declared rationality. For Socra-
tes, rationality is justice (morality). 
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Abbreviations 
Plato: 
Ap.    Apology 
Ch.    Charmides 
Crat.   Cratylus 
Cr.   Crito 
Eud.   Euthydemus 
Euthyph.  Euthyphro 
G.   Gorgias 
H.Min.  Hippias Minor 
H.Maj.  Hippias Major 
La.   Laches 
Ly.   Lysis 
M.    Meno 
Phd.   Phaedo 
Phdr.  Phaedrus 
Pol.   Politicus 
Prot.   Protagoras 
Rep.   Republic 
Tht.   Theaetetus 
 
Aristoteles: 
EN   Ethica Nicomachea 
EE   Ethica Eudemia 
MM   Magna Moralia 
Xenophon: 
Ap.    Apology 
Mem.  Memorabilia 
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